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ROBERT HEINEMAN: AUTHORITY AND THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION:  STUDY GUIDE, 2001-2003 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
Introduction 
 
Commentary and Study Questions 
 
The author's thesis may be summarized as follows: "Contemporary American liberalism 
is incapable of supporting for any sustained period of time a government that acts with firmness 
and coherent direction."  Several implications are immediately drawn.  Others may be inferred. 
Liberalism has promoted a "tremendous expansion of government within the past 
several decades," resulting in a "government lacking in authority and direction."  One inference is 
that our political means (the sophisticated apparatus and process of government) outstrip the 
political ends (the substantive human purposes) they are supposed to serve.  Remember 
Rushdoony's inescapable concepts].  Sometimes political programs are established for no better 
reason than that they can be.  Taking action, any action, against social problems offers its own 
self-justification.  The dilemmas caused by this arrogant "can-do" mentality are frequently 
expressed in modern literature, such as with Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and C.S. Lewis's The 
Abolition of Man.  Referring to American intervention in Somalia, Donald Snow and Eugene 
Brown call this attitude "the do-something syndrome." 
First Implication:  Liberalism favors the expansion of government as a political strategy 
but lacks a guiding purpose for doing so.  As a consequence, it lacks the capacity for supporting 
any coherent, substantive policy for a sustained period of time. 
Second Implication:  Government oversteps its bounds since it lacks a guiding and 
constraining purpose.  As a second consequence, public respect for authority declines, so 
"government must turn to coercion [Bastiat's idea of legal plunder] and material inducement [i.e., 
bribes such as subsidies] to achieve its ends." 
But what are these ends, since they have not been defined at the outset?  This leads to a 
Third Implication:  Government may not act with firmness and coherent direction because it has 
been retooled to promote the ad hoc purposes of those who control the government largesse and 
those who receive it.   As a third consequence, instead of a narrowly focused, consistent, firm 
guiding political vision, the ends of government activity are diffuse and chiefly revolve around the 
distribution of the spoils.  Thus, the national treasury becomes a kind of political slush fund 
serving whatever interests are successfully able to divert its resources to their own purposes 
To summarize:  "The expansion of governmental activity is a direct consequence of the 
inability of public officials to withstand the demands made of them."  This is a description of 
political weakness rather than political strength but a weakness that is all the more dangerous 
because of the sophisticated means it has available to enforce its increasingly irresponsible will.    
 
1. What are the requirements of effective government?  Why must public officials have 
authoritative status?  Where has the "diffuseness of policy focus" led?  Identify some of 
the objective factors that are generating today's crises that challenge the ability of the 
democratic system to survive.  (1-2) 
 
2. What are sub-governments?  Why is it difficult for a President or congressional majority 
to provide policy direction?  What about interest group politics has changed since the 
1960s?  What is the role of charismatic leaders?  [Max Weber identified three types of 
leadership: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational].  What are some of the avenues of 
influence used by interest groups?  Why have smaller groups pursuing their ideas of 
social justice become so influential?  What is the significance of the "incremental nature 
of the electoral process?"  How have these "social justice" groups affected public 
attitudes?  Illustrate by citing changing attitudes in foreign policy and domestic oil 
production.  (2-5) 
 
3. How did the traditional relationship between government and interest groups work?  How 
has the political process changed recently through “the rise of  non-economically driven 
interests?”  What has happened to compromise?  Why has the social base for democratic 
policy formation been eroded and destroyed?  NOTE: The Anglo-American liberal 
intellectual heritage owes "a great deal to governmental and non-governmental forms of 
social control" which gave rise to the idea of civil society.  What contemporary liberal 
misunderstanding is at the root of the problem?  How has politicization of interests left 
government officials “floundering in a sea of aggressive and increasingly irreconcilable 
demands?”  What must be done?  (5-7) 
 
4. What relationship does (or should) liberty bear to authority?  What need is primary?  
What is the default consequence of weak government?  How do we today misunderstand 
the Anglo-American tradition?  What are its (often unstated) ideological assumptions?  
What are its political ramifications and how have they evolved from Newton to Darwin 
and beyond (reform liberalism)?  What are the consequences of the idea that truth is 
relative?  (7-9) 
 
5. Identify some of the formative ideas of classical liberalism from seventeenth century 
England (Thomas Hobbes and, especially, John Locke).  Identify some of the influences 
 on American liberalism, first, before the Civil War, then, after the Civil War and the 
resulting reform liberalism.   What restrained laissez faire capitalism?  (9-10) 
 
6. Identify the author's underlying assumptions.   Distinguish between American liberal 
assumptions (the dominant view) and conservative assumptions.  Historically, who held a 
conservative view?  (10-11) 
 
7. The balance of the introduction is an outline of the author’s argument.  Beginning with the 
giants of Anglo-American liberalism, Hobbes and Locke, he moves next to the utilitarian 
liberal Bentham  and the conservative Burke, then to the Social Darwinist, Herbert 
Spencer.  The state interventionism of the reform liberals grew as a reaction to the 
excessive individualism of the Social Darwinists.  Neither side produced “a conceptual 
framework for the exercise of governmental authority because both positions were 
narrowly rooted in liberalism.”   Only a few thinkers have been able to distance 
themselves from both camps sufficiently to sketch out alternative perspectives. 
 
 “Ironically, the relative success of the state interventionists in disposing of laissez faire in 
the economic sphere has been accompanied by an increase in subjective social and 
philosophical positions that have seriously undermined government authority and at the same 
time made the need for such authority more pressing." 
 
Review 
         
authority   James Buchanan on scarcity  challenges to democracy 
sub-governments  charismatic leaders  1973 War Powers Act 
Alaska pipeline   Arab oil embargo of 1973 non-economic interests 
politicization of social interests Russell Kirk on order  Anglo-American tradition 
classical liberal assumptions reform liberal assumptions American liberal assumptions 
conservative assumptions Fourteenth Amendment 
 
Chapter One: Liberal Ideology in a Conservative Nation 
 
Commentary and Study Questions 
 
Liberalism -- in its philosophical, theological, and political guises -- majors in the forms 
and procedures of the life of the mind, the spirit, and the civil body politics but, at best, minors in 
their foundational truths.  Francis Schaeffer warned that one of the great flaws of the modern 
mindset is that it lives off the accumulated moral capital of a Christian civilization.  In recent years 
-- recent generations, even -- the bill has come due.  It is time to pay the piper.  Unfortunately, 
liberalism has played the piper -- the pied piper of Hamelin -- while calling the tune.  As J. 
Gresham Machen noted of theological liberalism in 1923:  "the great redemptive religion which 
has always been known as Christianity is battling against a totally diverse type of religious belief, 
which is only the more destructive of the Christian faith because it makes use of traditional 
Christian terminology.  This modern non-redemptive religion is called 'modernism' or 'liberalism.'"  
Theological liberalism is an outgrowth of nineteenth century process philosophy.  Like a parasite, 
liberalism draws on the substance of its host for its own sustenance.  But it can only deplete; it 
cannot replenish the stock from which it draws.  Similarly, political liberalism has been nourished 
by the faith and customs of a Christian civilization.  As the influence of Christianity over it 
diminishes, liberalism becomes ever more divorced from its sources of authority and more 
unrealistic in its aims.  It is increasingly compelled to extend its own sway through coercive 
means, seeking to remake mankind after its own image.  Lacking substance of its own, its center 
cannot hold because it is void.  The dirty secret of liberalism is that it eventually leads to nihilism.  
As Goya inscribed in an etching in Caprichos:  "the sleep (dream) of reason produces monsters." 
 
1. What does "liberal" mean today in the American context?  What was Louis Hartz's 
rationale for arguing that America has a "liberal consensus?"  Why has this so-called 
consensus been weakened?  What is the author's orientation?  What evidence suggests 
that reform liberalism is not solidly rooted in American tradition?  How do reform liberals 
disguise the disconnect between American values and liberal nostrums?  NOTE: The 
author is contrasting procedural values with substantive values.  Reform liberals 
emphasize the first, as do Hegelian and Darwinian process philosophies, which makes 
it difficult for them to address substantive moral issues without recourse to platitudes 
about fairness or slogans such as a woman's right to choose.   What has been lost during 
the evolution of liberal ideology?  What sort of confusion has resulted?  (15-18) 
 
2. What image of the New Deal holds pride of place at the center of reform liberal ideology? 
How did the economic doctrines of John Maynard Keynes help shape its activist view 
of government?   How was V. O. Key, Jr.'s influential typology of presidential elections 
(maintaining, deviating, reinstating, and realigning) itself influenced by reform liberal 
assumptions?  [See also endnote no. 15 on pp. 29-30].  Do these assumptions persist?  
What is the author's alternative hypothesis about the FDR and Eisenhower elections?  
QUESTION: Do the 1996 and 2000 elections strengthen or weaken the author's 
hypothesis?  Do they fit Key's?  (18-21) 
 
3. What was the indispensable pillar supporting the New Deal coalition?  What is it about 
the New Deal coalition makes the reform liberal hypothesis self-refuting?  Identify the 
non-majoritarian institutions that enabled FDR to move toward big government and the 
welfare state?  What made the New Deal coalition ultimately untenable?  What weakened 
the political effectiveness of Southern conservative resistance against the growth of big 
government?  By the time this coalition began to fragment in the 1950s and 1960s, "the 
reform liberals had gained sufficient control of national institutions to allow the continued 
influence of centralized bureaucratic power in the political system."  NOTE: Sidney Milkis 
contends that the Executive Reform Act of 1939 consolidated the New Deal's ideological 
grip over the federal bureaucracy so that it could become self-perpetuating.  (21-23) 
 
4. How did reform liberal thinkers like Richard Hofstadter and Marxists like Theodor 
  Adorno explain away conservatives and other critics of activist government?  [See 
  endnote no. 24 on page 30 about Hofstadter's concept of status politics].  How did 
  the presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater contribute to the "destruction of the liberal 
  illusion?"  What are some of the varieties of "politics by other means" that have enabled 
  reform liberals to maintain and shore up their institutional base?  (23-25) 
 
5. When did liberal and leftist scholars begin to acknowledge traditional democratic 
opposition to centralized government?  How were the biases of such studies as The 
Authoritarian Personality identified and refuted in subsequent scholarly studies?  [See 
endnotes nos. 31-32 on page 30].   (25-26) 
 
6. Why is traditional conservatism able to offer an alternative theoretical perspective on 
both the laissez faire and reform liberal paradigms?  Why do traditional conservatives 
typically support the desirability of limited government?  What positive role does 
traditional conservatism reserve for government?  How has liberalism contributed to the 
demise of effective government?  According to Theodore J. Lowi, what circumstance "left 
the national government at the mercy of organized interests?"  Indeed, what is the 
essential weakness of both stripes of liberalism?  NOTE: Here the transcendent or 
spiritual dimension of life is ignored in favor of the immanent or worldly dimension.  This 
is one variant of the problem of the one and the many that may, in this instance, lead to 
an elevation of technological means (the procedural values of laissez faire and reform 
liberals) over moral and cultural ends (the substantive values of traditional 
conservatives).    
 
7. How have liberal intellectuals distorted the political process in America and caused 
government to "become increasingly divorced from the daily values of the American 
public?"  Why has the political process become so embittered?  What is the fatal 
weakness of reform liberalism?  (28-29) 
 
Review 
 
Louis S. Hartz   reform liberalism  John Maynard Keynes 
V. O. Key, Jr.   reinstating elections  realigning elections 
New Deal coalition  Richard Hofstadter  Theodor Adorno 
The Authoritarian Personality Barry Goldwater  politics by other means 
traditional conservatism  ideological repression  fatal weakness of liberalism 
 
Chapter Two: The Origins of Liberalism: English Society 
and Political Ideas 
 
Commentary and Study Questions 
 
1. Thomas Hobbes laid the intellectual foundation for what subsequently became classical 
liberalism.  What sort of foundation was it?  How did Hobbes reconstitute the very 
assumptions and methodology of political thought?  NOTE: In Politics: A Very Short 
Introduction, Kenneth Minogue distinguishes between politics and despotism, the first 
pertaining to the arts of persuasion, the second to coercion.  Hobbes's concept of 
authority turns the ruler (or sovereign) into a master over servants (subjects) who are 
equal only to each other.  Thus Hobbes destroys the distinction between politics and 
despotism.  (33-34) 
 
2. Analyze the historical context and purpose behind Hobbes's De Cive and Leviathan.  
What was Hobbes's view of the individual in society?  NOTE: Hobbes summarizes the 
reasons why individuals must have an authority to "over-awe" them as 1) the scarcity of 
things men value (which leads to greed), 2) the passion for glory, and 3) diffidence 
(mistrust of others).  By treating these as the basic human drives Hobbes also promoted 
a "politics of distrust."  What did Hobbes believe to be the key to peace?  Summarize the 
paradigm transformation Hobbes wrought in political thought by noting how the 
foundations changed.  (34-35) 
 
3. What did Hobbes see as the basis for equality?  What is the foundation of a civil 
society?  How does Hobbes reflect contemporary liberalism's unwillingness to come to 
grips with the issue of authority?  NOTE: Medieval Christendom had the authority of God 
and his vicegerents at its foundation.  Clerics were the authoritative guardians and 
interpreters of God's Word.  Do our modern clerics -- scholars, artists, and intellectuals -- 
guard, interpret, or even recognize an infallible, authoritative Word?  (35-36) 
 
4. Why did Hobbes believe a scientific politics ("morall or civill philosophy") is necessary?  
By what means is it possible?  NOTE:  The sovereign thus becomes a kind of creative or 
engendering god ("creating meaning and value for his subjects"), much as with the 
ancient idea of the lex regia, the divine right of kings.  What is the primary goal of 
Hobbes's sovereign?  KEY POINT: Hobbes sought to create "a scientifically useful 
language that eliminated controversies of a seditious nature," i.e., controversies that 
threatened to undermine public respect for the sovereign (seditious libel).  What did 
Hobbes see as the purpose of "publique instruction?"   What does the "well-ordered 
commonwealth" require?  Why did Hobbes turn from the authorities of the past?  Where 
did Hobbes's successors get further sidetracked?  (36-40) 
 
5. Why is the work of John Locke open to a wider range of interpretation?  How has this 
enhanced his influence?  Why has he been so misunderstood?  What does his 1660 
manuscript reveal about his preferences?  What is the relationship of obedience and 
"freedom of conscience?"  What about the historical context of the Two Treatises helps 
explain the seeming inconsistencies?  What is meant by "the people?"  What political 
role did Locke envision for the property-less?  Identify the two stages of Locke's state of 
nature.  (40-43) 
 
6. What implications may be drawn from Locke's labor theory of value?  What evidence is 
there that Locke assumed the dominance of the propertied in England?  Why could he be 
untroubled in his support of strong government?  Did he advocate substantive limits on 
government?  What does this mean for protection of private property against government 
confiscation ("taking" in our Constitution)?  Why does a revolution not result in 
destruction of the community or social structure?  How has Locke's thinking been 
misinterpreted in the intervening centuries?  (43-47) 
 
7. How was Locke's thought used in eighteenth century England?  What evidence is there 
that England enjoyed a high degree of political and social stability during this period? 
Were the primary social supports -- assumptions and values -- primarily formal and legal 
or tacit and customary?  In what way did the ruling classes preserve the traditional 
relationships characteristic of feudalism?  [Examples would include the Poor Law of 
1601].  What is the relationship between the expanded power of the propertied and the 
creation of broadcast individual legal rights?  What was the single most important 
legitimizing force during this period?  What role did the courts of assizes play?  (47-50) 
 
8. Who -- Hobbes or Locke -- ultimately had the greater influence on the place of the 
individual in liberal thought, including subsequent extensions of suffrage?  Why did 
political thought atrophy?  What brought political thinking back into prominence in the 
nineteenth century?  The philosophy of the skeptic, David Hume, undermined the social 
contract theories of Hobbes and Locke, thus changing the terms of the intellectual 
debate by the late eighteenth century.  The next chapter examines Hume's challenge and 
Bentham's and Burke's contrary responses.  (50-51) 
 
Ultimately, Locke failed to define his terms.  As the author notes on page 50, Locke relied 
on unstated assumptions about property, which "may have left the field open for Hobbes's view to 
serve as the basis for contemporary American arguments on who may legitimately participate in 
the political process."  Thus the only authoritative word is that spoken by the individual, who, as in 
the ancient lex regia, becomes a "speaking law."  "In those days there was no king in Israel: every 
man did that which was right in his own eyes."  (Judg. 21:25) 
 
Review 
 
Thomas Hobbes  Leviathan    sovereign 
basic human drives  paradigm transformation prudence 
scientific politics  control of language  basis for effective governance 
John Locke   Two Treatises   the people 
state of nature   labor theory of value  Locke's assumptions 
legislative supremacy  consent of the majority  justification of revolution 
individual rights   courts of assizes  extension of suffrage 
 
Chapter Three: Bentham and Burke: Theoretical 
Alternatives to Governmental Authority 
 
Commentary 
 
 The natural law ideas of earlier thinkers, including Locke, fell victim to the attacks of the 
Scottish empiricist and skeptic, David Hume, in the eighteenth century.  "Hume destroyed the 
logical and scientific validity of those political beliefs and practices that liberals had cloaked with 
the claims of reason."     
The first important revision of liberalism (1775-1825) came in the form of the 
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and his followers, known as the philosophical radicals.  
Although a rationale for laissez faire individualism may be found in Bentham's Defense of Usury, 
"these ideas did not constitute an essential part of his utilitarianism."  Utilitarianism is a form of 
hedonism that seeks to maximize pleasure and minimize pain through a "felicific calculus" of 
costs and benefits, whether to the individual or society.  Socially, it seeks "the greatest good for 
the greater number," but this would offer little comfort to a minority of conscientious objectors in a 
society of cannibals. 
”The overriding thrust of Bentham's reformist position was toward the rational 
implementation of change through governmental action" (55).  Bentham's "reliance on formalistic 
rational analysis as the basis for public policy carried within it the seeds of political disruption and 
discord.  As he demonstrated with his early attack on Blackstone and the common law, his 
theoretical approach could have a devastating effect on accepted beliefs and practices. . . . The 
ultimate consequence of building on a foundation of formalistic or scientific rationality was the 
destruction of any viable source of national consensus for public policy or governmental action, a 
ramification that became increasingly obvious in twentieth-century America" (56).  His "highly 
formalized system . . . became artificial and subjective in its elaboration and application" (58), 
reflecting the eccentric personality of its creator.  In his failed panopticon proposal for penal 
reform, prisoners were to be kept under constant surveillance: a model that could be used for 
schools and factories, as well.  Public viewing of inmates were to be encouraged as an aid to 
rehabilitation.  It is no wonder the author sees Bentham as the spiritual father of the modern 
interventionist state with its emphasis on such procedural values as efficiency and utility. 
Bentham's leading disciple was James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, who deflected 
Bentham's penchant for reform in the direction of representative government and laissez faire 
individualism.  Mill's fear of government oppression led him to emphasize education as a means 
for remolding social habits.  Mill believed the middle classes were the opinion leaders of society 
and should be politically strengthened in that role through the expansion of suffrage. 
By contrast, the most practical response to Hume's challenge came from a practical man 
of politics, Edmund Burke.   Burke, the progenitor of the traditional conservative movement, 
"viewed the kind of a priori reasoning [abstract and non-experiential] used by Bentham in his 
pursuit of social tinkering as metaphysical and dangerous. . . . Thinkers such as the Utilitarians 
and the intellectual inciters of the French Revolution focused on the 'shell and husk' of history.  
They had no sense of man's needs or limitations.  In their ideological machinations, they falsified 
reality and misled men" (70).  Burke's idea of the social contract is that is "a partnership not only 
between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those 
who are to be born."  It combines reason, fact, and value, and has a place for non-governmental 
authority.  "The natural rights of Englishmen were those of equal justice, security in labor and 
property, enjoyment of the amenities of civilized institutions, and the benefits of order" (71).  
"Good government must, as Burke saw it, ensure social stability and yet protect the lower orders 
as well as the higher" (72).  Benevolence, perseverance, and flexibility are the ideal attributes of a 
political leader.  "Traditional leadership of this quality would inspire moderation on the part of the 
people, and their attachment to tradition would in turn inhibit leadership excesses.  In Burke's 
aphorism, "[k]ings will be tyrants from policy when subjects are rebels from principle." (72-73) 
Burke recognized the dangers of laissez faire individualism.  "Such a society would be 
like post-revolutionary France, a 'national gaming table' at which all would be forced to compete 
but where only a few would have the capacity for understanding and manipulating the rules" (73).  
By Burke's definition, individual rights "were not further claims on the government but were 
sources of social stability.  At the same time, Burke's thought utilized English tradition and custom 
to place government authority on a firm theoretical and constitutional foundation" (73).  But his 
ideas and adherence to tradition were not destined to carry the day.  Eventually, it was the laissez 
faire individualism and social scientific respectability of the social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, that 
captured the public imagination.  "In retrospect , however, it appears that the proponents of 
laissez faire owed acceptance of their ideas as much to the quiet social infiltration of practices of 
behavior control as they did to the persuasiveness of their claims of scientific or economic 
inevitability.  Almost without notice, the traditional forms of social control so eloquently defended 
by Burke had been replaced by institutional and economic means of control that rested quietly but 
effectively at the base of laissez faire ideology" (74). 
 
Chapter Four: Science as Social Ideology: The Cultural 
Constraints of Post-Bellum America 
 
Commentary 
 
 It was not Bentham or Burke, but the social evolution promoted by Spencer and Darwin, 
that set the stage for contemporary liberalism in America.  Even though Herbert Spencer 
regarded government mainly as an obstacle to progressive social improvement, his adaptation of 
liberalism to evolutionary theory (and process philosophy) planted the seeds for its subsequent 
transformation from individualism to collectivism.  "Spencer offered Americans a combination of 
evolutionary science and individualism that meshed exceptionally well with the needs of post-Civil 
War culture" (79).  "In Social Statics [1850], Spencer applied what he saw as the laws of 
biological development to the social sphere" (81).  Spencer justified his minimalist view of the 
state to the state's wastefulness and clumsiness in attempting to provide services.  State 
intervention deprives the individual "of the opportunity to develop to the fullest his capacity to take 
care of himself" (82).  Spencer's views encouraged the denigration of government and so colored 
subsequent debate that those who later argued in favor of state intervention were suspicious of 
ideological absolutes and "unable to provide an articulate, coherent value system for guiding such 
action" (83).  These reform liberals shared Spencer's optimism about human nature but still 
insisted that the people need guidance by the state. 
 In the absence of a feudal heritage, Americans were more vulnerable to the laissez faire 
hegemony than the conservative landed interests of England, who were willing to resort to state 
intervention to address social evils.  By the late nineteenth century, the influence in America of 
German educational theories and scholarship, which fit well with evolutionary theory, only further 
reinforced Spencerian orthodoxy, despite the German propensity to statism.  In the end, laissez 
faire set the terms of the debate and shaped the alternatives offered by its opponents.  "As 
events in America would have it, the reform Darwinists were so repelled by the rigidities of the 
Spencerians that they consciously refused to proffer substantive values, although they were 
willing to support a much greater degree of state action.  They were, however, unwilling to 
provide a coherent philosophical rationale for such action" (86). 
 
Chapter Five: Laissez Faire Becomes Public Policy 
 
Commentary 
 
 William Graham Sumner, the Yale sociologist who had earlier studied for the ministry, 
became the chief American exponent of limited government and individual freedom.  As Richard 
Hofstadter noted, Sumner "'brought together three great traditions of western capitalist culture: 
the Protestant ethic, the doctrines of classical economics, and Darwinian natural selection' . . . . 
Ironically, it was just this conjunction of ideological factors that ultimately was to undermine the 
claims of both the classical economists and the Spencerian individualists" (92). 
 Sumner taught that capital formation is a form of progress.  In defense of the hardworking 
"forgotten man," Sumner wanted to prevent "'do-gooders' . . . from using the state to implement 
their 'humanitarian' projects" (92).  The state owes its citizens nothing beyond "peace, order, and 
the guarantees of rights" (93).   For a period of six decades from the Slaughterhouse Cases 
(1873) until West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
state courts showed great sympathy for the rights of property and contract.  "During this 
period, the rights of corporate property were at a premium; the rights of the disadvantaged -- the 
working class, blacks, children -- tended to fall outside the sphere of constitutional protection.  
This development flowed not only from laissez faire economic doctrine, but also . . . from social 
Darwinistic considerations as to the betterment of the race" (96).   This chapter focuses on the 
role played by three Supreme Court justices: Stephen J. Field and his concept of economic 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment, Rufus Peckham and the idea of  "liberty of contract," and 
George Sutherland who led the Court's opposition to a minimum wage law in 1923.  
The key to understanding this period is not by concluding that the Supreme Court 
enforced laissez faire but that the Supreme Court, "in refusing to allow extensive governmental 
intervention in society, . . . was deferring to existing forms of social control" (104).  The author 
attributes these forms of social control to the institutionalized influence of Benthamism, citing 
Michel Foucault's argument in Discipline and Punish that "scientific-disciplinary mechanism" were 
"extended to prisons, schools, hospitals, military, and  workshops. . . . Certainly, the efficiency 
management pioneered by Frederick W. Taylor at the end of the nineteenth century provided but 
a more sophisticated form of the control of human behavior analyzed for an earlier period by 
Foucault" (106).  The limited government ideology came to favor the interests of the captains of 
industry through various legal benefits, relieving them of responsibility for the welfare of their 
employees outside the factory while also discouraging workers from becoming well-organized. 
 
Chapter Six: Liberalism and Social Reform: Government 
as the Reflection of Social Diversity 
 
Commentary and Study Questions 
 
 The laissez faire ideology, seen as a system, effectively stifled reform for decades.  Its 
power lay in its conceptual comprehensiveness.  But even as industrialists prospered under its 
regime, forces of change were at work that suited the conceptual needs of the reformers.  
Darwinism, which lent an aura of inevitability to laissez faire thought, proved to be its Achilles's 
heel once the evolutionary paradigm was appropriated by such pragmatists as John Dewey to 
support a changing conception of truth: i.e., an epistemological relativism which was further 
reinforced by Dewey's nominalism and egalitarianism.  "Under this new perspective, government 
was removed from its constitutional pedestal and fashioned into a tool for social interests" (112).  
Like the Locke and the later laissez faire thinkers they displaced, the reformers assumed a basic 
social harmony while depriving government of an independent reason for being, thus making it 
completely dependent on social interests. 
 The intellectual revolution began with a set of New England philosophical reformers 
known as the Metaphysical Club, who gathered in Cambridge.  Some of its members sought to 
defend metaphysical absolutes from the materialistic implications of Darwin's ideas.  Chauncey 
Wright attacked Spencer's scientific claims for asserting a purposeful progression in evolution 
toward teleological absolutes rather than chance mutations and adaptation to the environment.   
Charles Saunders Peirce called Spencer a "half-evolutionist" and coined the term pragmatism 
[or pragmaticism] for his own philosophy of science.  But, rejecting the relativism of the reform 
liberals, Peirce held that reality is independent of what we may think about it.  William James, 
the best known of the American pragmatists, rejected the Darwinian challenge to free will but 
eventually came to accept the pragmatic view of truth as a changing standard.  James, who 
adhered to what Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn called "the whiff from an empty bottle," adopted the 
concept of a finite god and regarded religious belief as a pragmatic way of improving the world.  
The atheistic instrumentalist philosopher John Dewey took pragmatism the last step into 
materialistic naturalism by disavowing all substantive metaphysical values, thus adopting an 
approach that "fit well with the social reform movement in its attention to social issues" (119). 
 "In terms of his influence on political thought, Dewey's ideas can be summarized under 
three themes: the rejection of universals [or absolutes], the social [as opposed to individual] 
character of human rationality, and the redefinition of philosophy as a process [no substantive 
values] and as the handmaiden of social reform" (119). 
The first position is that of philosophical nominalism: universals are merely the names 
we give abstract concepts.  Dewey held the consequences of ideas to be the criterion of truth.  
The young Dewey first came under the influence of the idealist philosopher and progressive 
historicist, G. W. F. Hegel, who "viewed society as an organic entity in which individuals found 
their meaning and freedom through their attachment to the social whole, a position diametrically 
opposed to the classical liberal view" (120).  Through the influence of the Cambridge pragmatists, 
especially James, Dewey -- like Marx -- eventually rejected Hegel's idealism.  But keeping 
Hegel's historicist perspective on society, Dewey "came to see philosophy as a method for 
utilizing human intelligence for the achievement of satisfactory conditions of living as judged by 
those affected by those conditions" (120).  Darwin's non-teleological evolutionary theory had 
dispensed with metaphysical forces altogether.  Since the classical economists had based their 
conclusions on unchanging economic principles [metaphysical absolutes], Dewey charged that 
they were unscientific in failing to recognize the historical relativity of their position and out of date 
because of subsequent social change.  "In twentieth-century America [as Dewey prescribed], 
progress resulted from social cooperation, not individualistic competition, and government was an 
important means for achieving social progress" (121).  Thus he believed that government must be 
flexible rather than constitutionally fixed so that it can intervene in society when and where it is 
needed.  As to the individual, "each person is the best judge of his interests.  'The man who 
wears the shoe knows that it pinches and where it pinches. . . '" (122). 
Even so, Dewey rejected an individualistic for a social concept of intelligence.  "Properly 
conceived, intelligence is a web of social relationships allowing for the communication and 
sharing of knowledge among the members of society so that each shares in scientific and 
technological advances."  But his position "provides little long-range guidance or support for a 
government that, by Dewey's definition, serves merely to adjust the differences in judgment that 
arise among interests in society" (122).  Dewey's attention to educational reform reflects his effort 
to facilitate a "social engineering approach to public policy" through an enlightened citizenry.  But 
"the openness of his approach made it vulnerable to use, or exploitation, by a wide variety of 
ideologies [especially socialism].  There is no question of Dewey's attachment to democracy as a 
process, but his jettisoning of the philosophical worth of substantive moral values made 
democracy a highly relative term -- a term that was to be extended to governmental systems that 
Dewey would unquestionably have found totally unacceptable.  Even within America, by the 
1960s and 1970s the economic laissez faire that Dewey criticized had, with the aid of his 
philosophical reticence, been replaced by a moral and social laissez faire of disquieting 
proportions" (123-24).  "In the final analysis, Dewey's attempt to apply scientific method to social 
policy had the deterministic implications that James feared" (125). 
 
1. How is the empirical evolutionary approach reflected in the judicial philosophy of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.?  What did he mean by saying that "the life of the law has been 
experience" rather than logic?  In what sense was he a model of judicial restraint?  In 
what way may it be said that he did the spadework for later judicial activism, such as 
the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound?  Why may Pound be charged with 
naivete?  (126-31) 
 
2. How does the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon (1908) and the Court's handling of 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954, 1955) exemplify sociological jurisprudence [as 
does Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which is discussed on pp. 170-71]?  Late in his 
career, what did Justice Hugo Black think of such judicial activism?  (131-32)   
 
3. How does the author summarize the evolution of the Anglo-American liberal tradition 
from Hobbes's theoretical support for governmental authority to the Dewey's omission of 
"authoritative legitimacy sufficient to implement coherent policy?"  (133)   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
